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Abstract 
  Firm insiders – a manager and a board – face moral hazard in relation to their 
outside shareholders in a repeated game with asymmetric information and stochastic 
market outcomes.  The manager determines whether or not outsiders are cheated; the 
board, whose objectives differ from those of outside shareholders, attempts to control the 
manager through compensation contracts and dismissal threats  Since compensation 
determines the manager’s incentive to cheat, firms competing for outside capital publicly 
announce their managerial contracts.  However, secret renegotiation between firm and 
manager is still possible:  so outsiders guard against being cheated by limiting their total 
stake in any firm.  This imposes a credibility constraint on firm size, providing a 
rationale for the shape of long-run cost curves.  Given this limit on outside funds, the 
minimum size requirement for enterprises to become operational and the ability to pay 
managers enough to ensure  honesty both set a floor to the personal wealth required to 
enter entrepreneurship.  Thus, we endogenize entry into industry, establish a unique 
equilibrium for any distribution of wealth, and characterize different equilibria.  We also 
explain features of poor countries like dominance of family firms,  moral hazard induced 
vicious circles that retard industrialization and the stimulus that inequality may provide to 
industrial development. 
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  In this paper we analyze a setup where firm insiders – a board and a manager – 
face moral hazard with regard to their outside shareholders.  While the manager decides 
whether or not outside shareholders are cheated, the board – whose interests do not 
coincide with the manager’s or the outside shareholders’ – may seek to influence him 
through instruments like the managerial compensation contract and threats of dismissal.  
We argue that public observability of managerial contracts does not in itself eliminate 
moral hazard, given the possibility of secret renegotiation ; and that outsiders can work 
out a “credibility ceiling” on the ratio of outsider to insider financing consistent with 
managerial honesty.  This pins down firm size in equilibrium, thus providing one possible 
answer to the long-standing controversy about long-run limits to firm size, and the shape 
of long-run cost curves.   
  Given our credibility constraint, two forces impose a floor on personal wealth 
required to enter entrepreneurship.  The first is a minimum size requirement on 
enterprise.  As credibility limits the amount of outsider finance forthcoming, the personal 
wealth of potential entrepreneurs has to exceed a certain floor.  The second is that 
entrepreneurs must  pay managers enough to ensure honesty – offering them “efficiency 
wages” of the Shapiro-Stiglitz variety (perhaps one should call them “honesty wages” in 
this context). This enables us to endogenize entry into entrepreneurship and characterize 
possible equilibria (there is a unique equilibrium for a given distribution of initial 
wealth).  Apart from implications for firm size, our model also explains features of poor 
countries such as the prevalence of family firms, moral hazard induced “vicious circles” 
retarding industrialization, and the possible advantages of inequality in the industrial 
development of a small open economy.  The link with the realm of development 
economics lies in the fact that our equilibria are influenced by the level and the 
distribution of wealth. 
Market outcomes in our model are stochastic, and the true performance level of a 
firm is only observable by insiders.  Insiders can therefore exploit their asymmetric 
  2information about firm performance to pretend to outsiders that the firm has been 
unlucky, appropriating the excess returns due to outsiders in a good state.  We explicitly 
introduce an incomplete contracting feature in the agreement between insiders and 
outside investors, due to the inability of the latter to observe firm performance. 
Investor payoffs are common knowledge, but this does not tell the public whether 
the insiders have cheated.  This is because outcomes being stochastic, poor investor returns 
may reflect either bad luck or cheating by insiders.  This is similar in some sense to the 
Green-Porter (1984) models of games with imperfect public information
2.  
The manager has the ability to cheat outside investors in the manner described.  A 
public signal detects cheating with a probability of q – but only in the next period. Past 
cheating by a firm, once exposed, is collectively remembered for ever. 
Our work is connected to many strands in the literature.  Agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders have of course been the subject of a vast literature in 
corporate finance (eg. Aghion and Bolton [1992], Jensen [1986], and Zwiebel [1996]). 
All these papers consider managers whose objectives differ from those of shareholders, 
or of investors in general.  The difference in objectives may be reflected in the manager’s 
choice of projects inimical to investor interests, or in his diverting free cash flow into his 
own pockets.  The latter option is closer to the situation we study in this paper.  Our focus 
is on a three-way relationship between boards, managers and outside investors, rather 
than only on manager-shareholder conflicts. 
 Our paper is also related to the literature on incomplete contracting and non-
verifiability.  This includes work on “relational contracting” (eg Greif [1991,1996]) and 
on honesty versus cheating in repeated game setups (eg Dixit [2003]).  Dixit considers a 
prisoner’s dilemma between randomly matched players.  In his paper, observability of 
payoffs is a sure guide to whether or not cheating has occurred – but this is not the case in 
our model. In ours, in spite of perfect observability of investor payoffs not just by the 
cheated investor but by the general public, extraneous  uncertainty regarding market 
outcomes means that even the cheated party cannot tell for sure (without an imperfect 
lagged public signal) if it has really been cheated. Unlike in the Dixit paper, in ours 
                                                 
2 Green and Porter (1984) discuss how low sales may reflect either low demand or rival pricing strategies by 
other firms. 
  3players are not randomly matched – investors have the choice of continuing with the 
same firm, and boards have the option to retain the same manager in future. 
Literature on controversies surrounding the long-run cost curve and the 
determinants of long run firm size is also relevant.  This dates back to Kaldor’s [1934] 
argument that a determinate limit on firm size within a particular industry requires a 
factor that is in limited supply to the individual firm, even in the long run, but has a 
definite supply price for the industry as a whole. Kaldor argued that long run firm size is 
in fact indeterminate, contesting the view that “co-ordinating ability” was in fact such a 
factor and that costs of co-ordination limited firm size in long-run equilibrium.  Whether 
or not we accept Kaldor’s views (elaborated on later in this paper), our paper provides a 
different mechanism from the standard textbook view to pin down firm size.  Credibility 
concerns caused by the possibility of secret renegotiation between the board and the 
manager affect the behavior of outside investors, so that the supply of outside capital to 
each firm is limited, even in the long run, while it has a definite supply price – derived in 
our paper –  for the industry as a whole.   Our explanation of the limits on firm size in the 
long run relies not on technology – broadly defined as properties of production functions 
- but on the presence of moral hazard.    
Our paper also relates to the development literature on imperfect markets for 
capital or credit.  For example, Banerjee and Newman (1993) trace occupational choice 
to the initial wealth distribution.  Credit is rationed to entrepreneurs on the basis of 
collaterizable wealth while each enterprise has a minimum investment requirement.  So  
only those whose wealth exceeds a certain floor can become entrepreneurs.  In our paper 
we combine indivisibilities in firm size with the moral hazard that entrepreneurs (insiders 
in our model) face with regard to their outside shareholders.  We have already mentioned 
that the idea of paying a manager substantially more than his outside option, which 
happens in our model, is akin to the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) “efficiency wage” concept in 
the context of imperfect monitoring. 
Our paper is also related to empirical work on corporate cheating and governance. 
Joh (2003) and Lemmon and Lins (2003) find, using evidence from East Asia, that 
malfeasance tends to be higher in firms with a divergence between ownership and control 
– that is, a high ratio of outsider to insider financing. This supports our theoretical 
  4prediction that a high ratio of outsider to insider financing intensifies moral hazard.  Peng 
and Roell (2004) show that the number of investor lawsuits brought against firms (i.e. the 
incidence of cheating) is negatively and significantly affected by the ratio of the “fixed 
salary” to the “bonus” component of executives’ compensation.   This fits in with our 
result that cheating is better deterred by paying the executive a fixed salary rather than a 
combination of a salary and a share in profits and that a high enough salary component 
can ensure honesty.  Other empirical work in support of this includes Graef Crystal’s 
(1991) finding that “long-term firm performance” as measured by ten-year shareholder 
returns (accounting for dividends as well as stock-price appreciation) is negatively and 
significantly related to the “long-term incentive payments” to the firms’ executives (these 
were in many forms and could involve giving the executive stocks, options, etc).   If poor 
long-term performance reflects executive cheating, then a larger component of share-
based pay seems to be positively correlated with cheating.   
This brings up the issue of profit-based executive compensation.  Many have 
pointed out the incentive effects of such compensation, arguing that bonuses induce 
greater efficiency.   However in our story, output, though stochastic, does not depend on 
the manager’s effort but on luck.  So the effect of giving the manager a share in insider 
profits is to increase his incentive to cheat the investors by exploiting his asymmetric 
information about whether the firm has experienced good or bad fortune.    
  Anderson and Bizjak (2003) find that more independence for the compensation 
committee over time does not seem to have reduced executive pay.  One explanation in 
terms of our model would be that managers need to be paid a certain amount to remove 
their incentives to cheat. This payment must be substantially greater than the managers’ 
outside opportunity cost (which for simplicity has been assumed here to be zero). 
  In section 2, we provide a detailed discussion of the assumptions underlying our 
model. In section 3, we characterize the managerial contract given public observability of 
managerial compensation while in section 4, we derive the effect of possible 
renegotiation. In section 5, we discuss the “credibility ceiling” and show that moral 
hazard imposes two constraints on the personal wealth of would-be entrepreneurs and on 
firm size; we also characterize possible equilibria for different distributions of initial 






Individuals live forever in a closed population with fixed and inelastic wealth. 
There is no saving
3, depreciation or borrowing, though lending is possible at an outside 
opportunity cost R. Agents are all risk-neutral. 
Each enterprise must reach a minimum size I before operation is possible. Thus 
for entrepreneurs whose funds F are less than this, going public is a necessity to set up 
business.  F may represent the collective funds of a group of insiders who combine to set 
up a firm.  Collective action problems limit the extent to which such pooling of funds is 
possible so that the minimum size requirement has considerable bite. 
Each enterprise lasts for one period after which outside investors have to decide 
whether to refinance the enterprise, or to costlessly transfer their capital to some other 
enterprise, or to invest it in the outside option. 
Enterprises earn a rate of profit G with probability p (the probability of “good 
luck”), and B otherwise, with G > B. The expected rate of profit is H = pG + (1 - p)B and 
exceeds R, justifying the existence of the industry.  Here G and B are exogenous - we are 
operating in a small open economy facing fixed world prices and exogenous shocks to 
output. 
In the ‘understanding’ between insiders and outsiders, outsiders are to receive an 
expected dividend of D (determined endogenously by the wealth distribution) on their 
capital S, the actual amount received in any period being proportional to G/H or B/H 
depending on whether good or bad luck has been realized.  Insiders as a whole are to 
receive an expected dividend of D on their capital F plus an extra amount such that the 
insiders’ and outsiders’ payoffs sum to total firm profits.  Insiders on average must get at 
                                                 
3 This assumption is discussed later in this section. 
  6least as much as outsiders do, otherwise they prefer to be investors in other people’s firms 
rather than to set up firms of their own. To simplify the analysis, we assume that this is 
true not only ex ante, but ex post as well.  The firm’s assets are redeployable so that if the 
enterprise is dissolved, erstwhile insiders may still invest their assets in other firms or in 
the outside option. 
The understanding between insiders and outsiders is not enforceable because the 
state of firm performance (whether the firm has experienced good or  bad luck) is 
observable only by insiders - it is not observable or legally verifiable by outsiders.   
Insiders can cheat by paying the outsiders their “bad luck” dues even when good luck has 
occurred – appropriating the excess. F,S,G,B and p are all taken as exogenous by the 
individual outsider.  Moreover, outsiders can observe the aggregate ratio of outsider to 
insider capital, which we denote by s. 
A publicly observable signal detects cheating with an accuracy (probability) q but 
only after it has occurred.  The information it conveys is available to all investors at the 
beginning of the next period. 
We assume that DB/H < R, so that investors prefer not to enter the industry if they 
expect to receive only their bad luck dues.  A sufficient condition for this to hold for all 
non-negative D and positive R is that B should be non-positive.  A weaker sufficient 
condition is that B should be smaller than R.  This is sufficient because as we will argue 
below, D can never credibly exceed H as this would be known to violate the insider’s 
participation constraint, making potential insiders more eager to become outside investors 
in other firms than to set up their own firms. 
We also introduce an agency structure within the firm.  We assume that the firm is 
characterized by an internal division of labor - all executive decisions are taken by an 
executive
4 with his personal objective function while the “firm” is broadly defined as the 
authority that hires and fires him.   The firm can use two instruments to control the 
executive – the compensation contract (assumed to be perfectly verifiable and enforceable) 
and the threat of dismissal (where this threat is credible).  The executives unconditionally 
                                                 
4We use the terms “executive” and “manager” interchangeably. 
  7maximize their expected payoff.  We assume further that the supply of executives is 
infinitely elastic at price zero – they do not in effect have an outside option       
Traditionally the agency problem has been viewed as a conflict between the 
interests of the shareholders and the manager.   A vast body of literature in corporate 
finance (Aghion and Bolton(1992), Innes (1990), Jensen(1986) etc) deals with a manager 
who either because of his private objectives or due to the nature of his compensation 
contract,  may take decisions which are sub-optimal for the firm – whether such decisions 
involve exerting too little effort,  or choosing the wrong kinds of projects.   In our 
treatment of the theme, we emphasize that the “investors” or “outside shareholders” are 
distinct from the “firm insiders” while at the same time, we also stress a possible conflict 
of interests within the insiders - the board and the executive.   The distinction we draw 
between insiders and outsiders is that only insiders, who directly run the firm, know the 
true state of firm performance.  We also assume that the outside shareholders do not have 
an active say in decisions such as hiring and firing managers, which is typically 
something the board of directors would do.  However the outsiders can observe such 
actions taken by the board and may draw their own inferences.  Thus in our setup shares 
may be too widely dispersed for individual outside shareholders to be able to effectively 
exercise control over management.   
As for the conflict of interest between the manager and the board,  the manager 
can siphon off private gains for himself beyond those envisaged by the board while 
setting his compensation package.   Thus, a manager, while cheating investors, can also 
appropriate some “private gain” ε (subject to a cap
5) which comes out of the firm.   We 
assume that the board cannot prevent this or that the extraction of this ε is not verifiable 
in courts and so cannot be punished by law though the board can try to control the 
manager using the instruments outlined above.   Where these instruments cannot serve as 
effective threats, the conflict becomes more marked.   The introduction of private gains 
drives a possible wedge between the board’s interests and the manager’s. 
                                                 
5 The logic for a cap, as explained later in the text, is that appropriation of very large gains by the manager 
may be easier to prove in court – verifiability beyond a limit implies that appropriation of gains beyond this 
cap can be ruled out by sufficiently harsh penalties. 
  8Can the “manager” we model below be considered the CEO of the firm?  The 
manager in our model takes the action which determines whether or not insiders as a 
whole cheat outside shareholders.  He also has a chance to steal directly from other 
insiders.  Whether he will in fact do this will depend on the contract offered and his 
personal optimization decision.  Now one of our assumptions here is that the board 
determines the compensation of the manager.  This manager could then be the CEO if we 
believe that the board of directors is independent of the CEO and can make autonomous 
decisions regarding his compensation, his appointment or his dismissal.   While this is 
true in theory, case studies, such as Graef Crystal’s, indicate that the CEO often suggests 
the salaries that board members should pay themselves.   This introduces circularity in 
the sense that the board’s decisions regarding the CEO are then affected by an added 
factor, the influence of the CEO on the salaries and perks of its members.   Moreover, 
sometimes CEOs have served on the compensation committees of their own boards.     
These facts seem to suggest that an analysis which draws a distinction between the 
executive and the board could be more aptly applied to some other executive who does 
not have this kind of power over the board’s decisions.   In recent times, however, the 
compensation committees of boards have become much more independent.   As 
Anderson and Bizjak (2003) point out, changes in SEC rules in 1992 and 1993 
discouraged senior executives from serving on compensation committees and by the end 
of 1998 CEOs were essentially absent from compensation committees in the 110 NYSE 
firms in their sample.  Recent evidence also points to the fact that CEOs no longer serve 
on compensation committees.  Further, we do not rule out collusion to cheat investors 
between board and manager.   As for hiring and firing, in theory the board has the right to 
hire and fire CEOs, but cases abound of the CEO appointing his cronies to the board – 
even if they are not insiders they may have some sort of link with the CEO.   These 
would fall under the purview of the collusion alluded to above.   Moreover, though we 
assume that the board can fire the executive, we predict that such firing would not occur 
in equilibrium.   Empirically this would lead us to observe that senior executives or CEOs 
are only fired very rarely. 
Of our assumptions, the one that needs further discussion is that of no savings.  We 
assume zero savings so as to focus on the distinctive consequences of cheating without our 
  9results being obscured by the changing dynamics of the accumulation and distribution of 
wealth.  Zero saving makes the distribution of wealth exogenous.  It eliminates complex 
feedback effects such as the possibility that firms which go public may ultimately save 
enough out of current income to raise entrepreneurial wealth above the threshold needed to 
set up business without reliance on outside capital. 
Somewhat extreme assumptions with regard to savings are in fact common in the 
literature where they serve a variety of purposes.  For example, Galor and Zeira [1993] 
assume that no one consumes at all in the first of the two periods that he lives;  Bernanke 
and Gertler [1989] assume that some agents consume only after retirement.  Some licence 
is usually permitted in the literature with regard to the savings assumption. 
In our model, however, the no-savings assumption can possibly be justified as 
follows.  With the standard postulate of risk-neutrality and constant time-preference, the 
intertemporal utility function can be written as 
U = ∑δ
tct
where ct is consumption in the t-th period.  The net gain in utility from a one-period 
postponement of a unit of t-th period consumption is then 
δ
t[– 1 +  δ(1 + rt)] 
where rt is the return to capital in the t-th period.  With risk-neutrality, savings are no 
longer needed to smooth consumption.  They now reflect only the difference, if any, 
between the rates of time-preference and of return to capital.  When these are independent 
of consumption, savings have a bang-bang character.  If capital is consumable and time 
preference higher than the rate of return, all wealth is consumed in the first period.  If the 
rate of return is higher, all income is saved and consumption perpetually deferred .   
Savings will be exactly zero if (1) capital is not consumable (again a standard assumption, 
see Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) and (2) time preference is higher than the rate of return.
6  
In a model where the highest rate of return is H, it is sufficient for zero savings if H < (1 – 
δ)/δ – a restriction not inconsistent with any of our results. 
                                                 
6 No individual can dissave by trading capital for output, since, if one wishes to dissave, so will everyone else 
– so that the potential dissaver cannot find anyone to trade with. 
  10One question of course remains.  Where did the wealth come from if there are no 
savings?   All wealth could be land, where output has a life-span of just one period.   
Alternatively, in an industrial economy, wealth could be machinery, that the country has 
received through foreign aid or as war reparations.  We wish to focus on the problem of 
cheating independently of the level or distribution of wealth;  and all we need is that the 
zero-savings assumption should be self-consistent, not that it should be realistic. 
 
3. The Honesty Prison  
 
  Managerial contracts are common knowledge when initially announced.  A 
contract (Φ,  ) specifies the manager’s share Φ in the insiders’ profits as well as a fixed 
salary  . Φ includes a share not only in the insiders’ legitimate profits, but also in their 
one-time cheating gains – extracted by paying outsiders their “bad luck dues” even when 
luck has been good.  The size of such gains would then be the difference between the 









. We focus on contracts that specify non-negative values of both Φ and   and 
a positive value for at least one of them.  In addition to his contractual income, the 
executive can steal an amount ε from the firm.  ε  is capped at 
LGB =−
* A
ε  - perhaps because a 
larger theft would be provable in a court of law, and therefore may be ruled out by 
sufficiently harsh penalties.  All thefts, in turn, run the risk of being detected (with a 
probability q) by the public signal at a later date.   
  The timing of moves is as follows.  First, firms announce compensation 
contracts. Boards recruit from the pool of available executives.  Then outside investors 
decide whether to invest or not.  The information available to them at this point relates to 
the managerial contract, the firm’s choice of managers, the payoffs distributed by the 
firm earlier and the public signal that gives a clue as to whether the insiders cheated in 
the previous period.  Finally, firms realize their outcomes.  Managers distribute payoffs to 
shareholders, having decided whether to be honest or to cheat (their outside shareholders 
and also perhaps their boards) in the process.   The public signal indicates cheating by the 
  11executive with probability q.  Firms decide whether to retain their executives or to 
dismiss them.  Investors decide whether to reinvest in their existing firm or withdraw and 
invest elsewhere.  This cycle is then repeated indefinitely.  
  
Proposition 1: Given credible public disclosure of initial contracts, an infinitely elastic 






a necessary condition for equilibrium is that the initial managerial contracts must be such 
that managers are induced to act honestly and no managers are dismissed. 
Proof:   If Φ = 0, managerial compensation is independent of the insiders’ profits – so the 
manager has no incentive to cheat outsiders.  An executive without a stake in the firm 
would not cheat outside investors directly.  If contracts are credibly disclosed to the 
public, investors would shun any firm that offers its manager Φ > 0.  All firms 
accordingly are compelled to offer Φ = 0
7.   The manager however could steal a 
maximum of ε  from the board, though at the cost of possible exposure.  This could be 
prevented if boards set the manager’s salary at a sufficiently high level   and made the 
threat that following public exposure, the manager would be fired, and never rehired in 
the corporate sector again.  This threat is credible because there is an infinitely elastic 
supply of managers.  In this case, the manager will weigh his maximum gains from 
stealing against the expected value of his future salary losses in the event of exposure.  
The collective nature of the threat is important because if the fired executive expected to 
be hired again by other firms, the threat would lose its bite
* A
8.  We need two conditions for 
this to work – the first ensuring that in the circumstances, honesty is incentive-compatible 
                                                 
7This is relevant to the initial contract announced by the boards. We will come later to the possibility of 
secret renegotiation. 
8This does not require co-ordination among boards. Other boards – whose managers have not cheated – 
already have their incumbent managers and in any case also have access to an elastic supply of potential 
managers. 
  12for the executive, and the second ensuring that boards find it worthwhile to suppress 










                                                       (1) 
Given that boards want to pay the lowest salary possible in the interests of profitability, 








=                                                         (2) 
The second condition would be fulfilled if the high salary defined by (2) is still less than 
the amount the executive could have stolen.  Then boards would have an incentive to pay 
this salary in order to rule out cheating.  So we need 
* A ε ≤                                                              (3) 





                                                            (4) 
So both conditions are fulfilled for a sufficiently high discount factor or a high enough 
probability of detection of cheating.  We note that the threat of not employing an 
executive fired by another firm and exposed as a cheat by the public signal is essentially 
costless to other firms – given that managers are in infinitely elastic supply - and is 
therefore credible.  Thus given (4) and public observability of contracts, we have a 
situation in which managers do not cheat either outside investors or their boards, and are 
not dismissed either.  Q. E. D. 
 
For the rest of our analysis we focus on the case where (4) is satisfied.      
Boards would prefer the managers to cheat outside investors as long as  
[( )( ) *]
1









or   
(1 )
[( )( ) *]
DSL
q







The derivation of this is as follows.  The one-time gain that would accrue to boards as a 




( DS G B
H
) −
 - the excess of the dues to 
  13outsiders payable in the good state over the outsiders’ bad state dues.  For cheating to be 
worthwhile, this should exceed the present discounted value of the losses to the board in 
the event of possible exposure by the public signal.  Now the size of these losses, when 
assets are redeployable, is  
() m a x { , }* H FS D S D R FA + −− − 
Here, the first term represents expected total profits in the industry.  The second term 
shows what is paid to outsiders and is therefore subtracted from insiders’ profits.  The 
third term reflects the redeployability of assets : in the event of exposure and dissolution 
of the firm, insiders have the option of becoming outsiders in other firms, or of availing 
themselves of the “outside option” which pays R.  This fact reduces the prospective 
losses from exposure.  So does the fourth term because, if exposed, boards will no longer 
have to pay out the salary  * A  to their managers.  Now, since D will never fall below R 
(because of the outsiders’ participation constraint), the prospective losses simplify to 
() ( ) * H DF S A − +− . 
Thus the condition that boards prefer cheating is : 
[( )( ) *]
1









or   
(1 )
[( )( ) *]
DSL
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  Were this  the end of the story, the firm would be walled up in an ‘honesty prison’.  
Given the initial contract, its executive, regardless of type, would have no incentive to 
cheat even though it wants him to do so.   What is more, it cannot dismiss him for this act 
of defiance- such a dismissal, following an act of honesty (a payout of DG/H) would 
brand a firm as a potential cheat and precipitate an exodus of investors.  
 
4.  A Way out of Jail? 
 
  However,  it is vital to consider the possibility of renegotiation.  The board has a 
strong incentive to secretly renegotiate the contract it has publicly offered its executive.  
  14If secret renegotiation is feasible,  the firm may offer a secret contract (Φc, Ac), different 
from the (0, 
* A ) necessitated initially by mandatory disclosure or public observability of 
initial contracts.  We show below that, though feasible, this is not an optimal strategy. 
 
Proposition 2:  A secret, renegotiated contract is worthwhile only if the ratio of outsider 
to insider capital s exceeds a certain threshold definable in terms of observable 
parameters, given by inequality (11”) below.   
 
Proof:  Let Yc be the total expected payoff of an executive who cheats in such a firm.   
Yc = Φc[H(F+S)-DS + p 
DSL
H
] + (1- Φc)[Ac + ε] + δ(1-q)Yc
The first two terms on the right hand side give the manager’s expected payoff from 
cheating.  The cheating gains are multiplied by p because cheating in this model occurs 
conditionally on good luck. The last term indicates that cheating executives can continue 
to realize their discounted payoffs from cheating if and only if they are not caught by the 
public signal.  Here we assume that executives caught cheating and fired are never 
rehired and have no outside option.  Rehiring would mark firms out to the public as firms 
who wish to cheat. 
We have 
Yc = 
[( ) /]( 1 ) ( )
1( 1)




Φ+ − + + − Φ +
−−
 
Executives prefer the renegotiated contract to the one publicly imposed in the honesty 






                                                   (5) 
If (5) is satisfied, an executive offered Yc will refrain from cheating his board. Thus the 
by-product of a new contract acceptable to managers is that such a contract would also 
ensure that the firms seeking to renegotiate are not cheated by their own managers.   
However, successful renegotiation also has two other requirements.  First, one 
should be able to rule out the possibility of executives accepting the firm’s renegotiated 
contract but then refusing to cheat.  An executive who did this cannot be fired; payoffs 
  15and firings being common knowledge,  such a dismissal would expose the firm as a 
potential cheat
9.  This  requirement implies: 
Yc ≥  
[( ) ]( 1 )
1
cc c H FS D S A
δ
Φ +− + − Φ
−
                                (6) 
Can we characterize the contract (Φc, Ac) more specifically?  Since the expected income 
of the board in the event that it cheats is negatively related to the expected income Yc that 
it must concede to its manager, the board decides the contract that it offers its manager by 
minimizing Yc subject to the constraints (5) and (6). It minimizes 
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where σ is a minuscule differential between Yc and the terms within square brackets. 
This exercise implies  
A*  =  Φc{H(F+S)-DS}+(1-Φc)Ac.                                  (8) 






  + σ                                                      (9) 
 
A second requirement is that boards should themselves have an incentive to 
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A necessary and sufficient condition for (10) to be satisfied simultaneously with (9) is 
{( ) }
1







> 0                                              (11) 
                                                 
9 Note that an instance of an executive deliberately not cheating when there is an opportunity to do so 
implies in our model that he pays outsiders their “good luck dues” instead of their “bad luck dues” when 
luck is good. Thus if outsiders observe that a manager is fired after they have got a good payoff, they can 
immediately infer that the board intends to cheat. 
  16The expected gains from one-time cheating should exceed the present value of the stream 
of expected losses from the next period onward in the event of exposure.  (11) implies  
(1 )
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Here we use s to denote the ratio of outsider to insider capital. Alternatively, (11) can be 
written as a lower limit on s, the ratio of outsider to insider capital: 
2
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D =                                (11”) 
Q.E.D 
 
5. Back to Prison 
 
The threshold s
h(D) represents a credibility ceiling for the outsider-to-insider 
capital ratio.   At any s > s
h(D), firms, though they may announce a managerial contract 
that constrains their managers to honest behavior, will renegotiate with the latter a secret 
contract that induces them to cheat investors.  Outsiders, knowing this, will avoid 
investing unless s is reduced to s
h(D) or lower.  All firms, on the other hand, will drive s 
up to s
h(D), since, for any given D < H, their profits are an increasing function of s.  On 
each unit of outsider capital they attract, they make a profit of H-D. Moreover, D will 
never exceed H as this would violate the insiders’ participation constraint, since in that 
case being an outsider would clearly be more attractive than becoming an insider. The 
inequality (11”) reduces therefore to an equation that represents essentially the firm’s 
demand for outside capital as a function of the market return D on outside share capital.  
Thus firm size is pinned down. 
This is subject however to the firm’s participation constraint - D must never exceed 
the rate of return on entrepreneurial capital since that would prompt the entrepreneur to 
close down his business and invest in other firms instead.  The implication is  
H(F + S) – DS – 
* A  ≥ DF 
or H – 
* A
F S +
 ≥ D.                                              (12) 
 
  17Interestingly, we see from constraint (12) that firms with larger insider equity (and 
therefore more total equity – given that (11’’) becomes an equality) find it easier to meet 
the participation constraint.  This is an instance of a “vicious circle” in effect, a vicious 
circle springing from the fact that poorer firms cannot pay the manager his “efficiency 
wages”(wages high enough to ensure honesty) and cannot therefore start an enterprise.  
Thus if (12) is not met, potential entrepreneurs find outside investment more profitable.  
All this corresponds to a game-theoretic equilibrium in which (a) investors believe 
that any firm that exceeds the limit s
h(D) will secretly renegotiate a contract with its 
manager that induces him to cheat and so withhold their funds from such firms, (b) firms 
know this and expand up to this limit, but never beyond it, (c) there is therefore no secret 
contracting and no cheating in equilibrium.  This helps us in pinning down firm size 
explicitly so that renegotiation, though feasible, does not take place in equilibrium. 
One of the two constraints defining a floor on personal wealth required to enter 



















F =                                         (13) 
While constraint (13) defines a floor on entrepreneurial wealth that springs from the 
entrepreneur’s need to pay the manager high enough wages for honesty to be credible, 
there is a second floor which arises from the minimum size requirement for an enterprise 












>= F                                                 (14) 
Both the floors   and   are decreasing in   and increasing in D. The intuition is that 
a high D implies a high payout to outside investors, increasing the insiders’ temptation to 




  18low.  This in turn implies that only those with high personal wealth can enter 
entrepreneurship, given the difficulty of mobilizing much outsider capital. 
  We now combine our game theoretic analysis with simple general equilibrium 
techniques to endogenize D and characterize equilibria for different possible parameter 
values. We will show that equilibrium is unique for a given initial wealth distribution. 
  Now which of the constraints (13) or (14) is binding depends on parameter values. 
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HR − <                                                        (15) 
given the outsiders’ participation constraint, 
DR ≥                                                        (16) 
In this case, a person whose wealth satisfies (13) also automatically satisfies (14), so 
becomes the relevant floor on entrepreneurial wealth. 
*(() )
h FsD
Now suppose K is the aggregate wealth of the economy and P(W) the fraction of 
total wealth owned by those with wealth below W.  Then the total demand for outside 
capital generated by the entrepreneurs who can enter is 




Here, the term in square brackets represents the ratio of entrepreneurial capital to the total 
wealth of the economy.  The RHS, therefore, represents the amount of outside capital that 
entrepreneurs can apply for without compromising their credibility.  As D falls, not only 
can each firm credibly apply for more outside investment, but also more firms can enter 
and create additional demand for capital (as  also falls).  We can easily check that the 
demand for outsider capital is zero at D = H and increases steadily as D falls. 
* F
The total supply of outside capital is the total wealth of those below the minimum 
threshold required for entry: 
Xs = KP[ ]                                          (18) 
*(() )
h FsD
  19This is subject to (16), the outside investors’ participation constraint. The supply curve of 
outsider capital thus has a horizontal stretch at D = R and then slopes upward. Given the 
demand and supply curves defined in (17) and (18), there can be two kinds of equilibrium, 
depending on the initial wealth distribution : 
(1) An interior equilibrium with H > D > R (Fig 1). The equilibrium D solves 
*
*
P[F ( ( ))]
()
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This is unique given the monotonicity of supply and demand.  The interior equilibrium 
obtains for parameter ranges where  
* (( ( ) ) ( ) [ 1 (( ( ) ) ]
hh h P FsR sR P FsR <−
*
*
                                   (20) 
In this equilibrium, outside capital is fully employed in industry, with none of it in the 
outside option.  Therefore the return D on outsider capital strictly exceeds R. The optimal 
ratio of outsider to entrepreneurial capital just matches the ratio of wealth owned by those 
below the minimum wealth requirement for entry to that owned by those above and is 
uniquely determined by the distribution of wealth. 
(2) An “excess supply” equilibrium in which D = R, the participation constraint of the 
investor binds and investors are indifferent between investing in the firm and outside
10 
(Fig. 2).  This equilibrium occurs for parameter ranges such that 
* ( ( ( )) ( )[1 ( ( ( ))]
hh h P FsR sR P FsR >− .                    (21) 
There also remains a possibility  that no market may exist. If Wmax is the wealth of 












then, for all D ≥ Dmin , Xd = 0.  Demand for outside capital is  positive only for D < Dmin .  
Now, if Dmin < R, the minimum supply price of outside capital, the demand and supply 
curves will not intersect.  No equilibrium will be possible (Fig. 3).  Note that a low Wmax 
implies a higher  , and therefore a low D min (
h sD)
                                                
min.  Thus in a uniformly poor society, a 
market is unlikely to exist. 
 
10 However, investors will take care that their investment in the firm is not so much that it tempts cheating. 
  20What if the binding constraint on entrepreneurial wealth were (14), not (13)? This 




HD − >  
In this case,   replaces   as the relevant threshold in (17)-(21). The derivation 
of demand and supply curves is similar. However, now the demand curve will have a 






DH =−  and will begin to decline thereafter (D cannot exceed this 
limit). The presence of the horizontal stretch implies that, in addition to the interior 
equilibrium and the excess supply equilibrium, a third kind of equilibrium may be possible 
for certain configurations of the initial wealth distribution.  This is the equilibrium where 
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Again, it is possible that a market may not exist, if no one is sufficiently wealthy.  







1 = − . 
As already emphasized, for a given range of parameters, there is only one 
equilibrium (and for some, there are none). High δ ,qor H or low  L lead to a higher   
for a given value of D.  Thus if agents care more about the future, if public transparency 
is high or if the expected profit in the industry is high,  relative to the cheating gains, a 
greater fraction of outsider capital can credibly be demanded for the same payout rate D.  
These factors would make the “excess supply” equilibrium less likely to obtain compared 
to the other kinds of equilibrium. When (13) binds – which happens for relatively low 
h s
I - 
relatively high values of A* (which in turn implies low δ , low   or high  q ε ) can lower 
the equilibrium D, making likelier either an “excess supply”equilibrium or no equilibrium 
at all (and therefore no industry). If instead (14) binds, a high value of I  lowers the 
  21equilibrium D and has a similar effect.  The intuition is simply that large indivisibilities 
imply that a large amount of capital is necessary to set up enterprise.  To be compatible 
with credibility, this large ratio of outsider capital has to be balanced by a low D.  If the 
vel of D compatible with credibility is below R, however, there will be no market. 
. Discussion 
t relates to insights about 
rm siz
, boards’ and managers’ 
m cannot exist in 





  Our model has two different sets of implications. One se
fi e while the other relates to developmental implications.  
   Outside investors in our model would recognize that even if the law mandated or 
competition compelled public observability and transparency of managerial contracts, the 
possibility of false disclosure and secret renegotiation would persist.   Interestingly, it is 
the possibility of renegotiation that effectively limits the size of the firm – outsiders 
recognize that if their financing exceeds a certain threshold
incentives to renegotiate and cheat may become too powerful.  
  All this bears on an age-old controversy in economics regarding  the long-run cost 
curve and the limits to firm size in long-run equilibrium.  While the rising portion of the 
U in short run cost curves can easily be attributed to fixed factors, factors are not fixed in 
the long run.  Therefore the U shape of long run cost curves, in particular its upward-
rising segment, has sometimes been attributed to increasing pressure on the limited 
coordinating capacities of the entrepreneur (Kaldor,1934).  Coordination is a function 
that is unitary by its very definition because if the number of coordinators multiplies, the 
problem arises of coordinating the coordinators.  Therefore, as the scale of production 
increases, the strain on the coordinator grows, resulting in inefficiencies of control and 
coordination.  However, equilibrium implies by definition that all coordination problems 
have been resolved – so that this particular limit on the size of the fir
long run equilibrium
11.  Quoting Kaldor (1934), 
“For the function which lends uniqueness and determinateness to the firm – the ability to 
adjust, to co-ordinate – is an essentially dynamic function ; it is only required so long as 
 
11 This point closely follows Kaldor (1934). 
  22adjustments are required ; and the extent to which it is required … depends on the 
frequency and the magnitude of the adjustments to be undertaken.  It is essentially a 
feature not of “equilibrium” but of “disequilibrium”; it is needed only so long as, and in 
so far as, the actual situation in which the firm finds itself deviates from the equilibrium 
situation.  With every successive adjustment to a given constellation of data, the number 
of “co-ordinating” tasks still remaining becomes less and the “volume of business” which 
a given unit of co-ordinating ability can most successfully manage becomes greater; until 
finally, in a full-period long-run equilibrium (in Marshall’s stationary state), the task of 
management is reduced to pure “supervision,” “co-ordinating ability” becomes a free 
good and the technically optimum size of the individual firm becomes infinite (or 
 the long run, but which had a definite supply price 
uilibrium, our work highlights a novel factor which 
helps to
indeterminate)…”  
  Kaldor thus disagreed with the views of other scholars that increasing costs of co-
ordination could limit the size of the firm in long-run equilibrium. However, there was a 
consensus that to pin down firm size, what was needed was a factor whose supply was 
limited at the level of the firm, even in
as far as the industry was concerned.  
  In our model, the size of the firm is limited by credibility concerns. Given 
asymmetric information (with regard to firm performance), outside investors realize that 
if they provide more than a certain amount of financing to any one firm, that firm’s 
temptations to cheat them may be too strong.  This generates a scarcity of an essential 
input – outside capital – in the long run.  Outside capital is limited at the level of the firm, 
but has a definite supply price D for the industry as a whole – a supply price which we 
have endogenized by embedding our game theoretic model in a simple general 
equilibrium framework.  Moreover, the reason why outside capital is limited, at the level 
of the firm – becoming perfectly inelastic beyond a point – lies in moral hazard and not in 
any technological properties of production or cost functions.  Whether or not we agree 
with Kaldor’s views on the inability of the traditional framework to result in a 
determinate firm size in long-run eq
 avoid such indeterminacy.  
  23We now turn to some developmental implications of our model
12.  In poor 
countries, industrialization is hampered not just by an aggregate scarcity of wealth but by 
difficulties in mobilizing and concentrating it to support large-scale industry if it is too 
thinly spread. This is due in part to the well-known constraints on borrowing.   Our model 
demonstrates that raising share-capital is also subject to a credibility ceiling, a limit on the 
ratio of outsider to insider capital set by concerns over cheating.  This is one reason why 
share markets are underdeveloped in most poor countries and why firms in early modern 
Japan, Korea and India and within the Chinese Diaspora relied so heavily on extended 
family groups within which credibility was less of a concern than in an anonymous share 
market.  This is also perhaps the reason why governments like the Korean deliberately 
skewed
e
will shift leftward, 
the sup
phenomenon.  It affects output only if the production pattern reflects the 
consum
y finds it 
easier t
 income distribution towards the chaebol, enabling the accumulation of personal 
fortunes that could help in building up credible large-scale industries
13. 
If a market exists, if, for instance, we have a regular interior equilibrium, the return 
to outsid  capital D will decrease as the distribution of a given aggregate wealth becomes 
more equitable:  if P( ) is higher for any W,  the equilibrium ratio of outsider to insider 
capital 
h s  will be higher, the demand curve for outside capital Xd(D) 
ply curve Xs(D) will shift rightward, so that D falls.  With increasing equity, the 
equilibrium level of D may fall below R, so that the market disappears. 
This view of equity as inimical to industrialization contrasts strongly with received 
doctrine. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny [1989], for instance, see equity as the basis of a 
homogeneous mass market for manufactures that fosters industrialization.  This, however, 
is a demand-side 
ption pattern, as it must in a closed economy.  In a small open economy, the two 
are independent. 
Given the same Lorenz curve, a higher aggregate wealth facilitates 
industrialization. P(W) is smaller for a given level of P, so that, other things being equal, 
outside investors will enjoy a higher expected income D.  A wealthier econom
o sustain a credible capital market. We have yet another factor that tends to make 
industrialization a cumulative process and yet another vicious circle of poverty. 
                                                 
12 A related paper, in which however the agency problem within the firm is assumed away, is Guha (2005). 
13  Lal and Myint (1996) provide a good discussion of this. 
  24Finally, if the minimum-size constraint (14) binds, rather than the “honesty wage” 
constraint (13), an increase in minimum firm-size  I with the same level and distribution of 
wealth will increase P for any given s*: the demand curve for outside capital will fall and 
the supply curve rise, reducing D and increasing s* in equilibrium.  Technological 
indivis  
 
ed executive pay 
nderson and Bizjak (2003)).  All these findings bear out our conclusion that paying the 
h – even when he has no say in the matter – may be a condition for 
redibility, provided this compensation is independent of insider profits. 
exceed a credibility ceiling.  The 
e outside shareholders.  Thus, the wealth distribution 
uniquely determines the equilibrium where it exists (including the rate of return to 
ibilities make for missing markets.  If, however, the “honesty wage” constraint
binds, an inaccurate public signal (poor transparency) or excessive impatience would raise
the wage consistent with credibility, and increase the likelihood of market failure. 
If  the aggregate ratio of outsider to insider capital can be concealed (for instance 
by secret selling of insider stake) cheating can occur, as the actual ratio might well be 
raised beyond the safe limit.  Empirical evidence – such as the studies already mentioned 
of Joh (2003) and Lemmon and Lins (2003) suggests that a high ratio of outsider to 
insider capital intensifies moral hazard. It also suggests that cheating is negatively 
associated with the salary component of executive pay (Peng and Roell (2004)), and that 







  We embed a repeated game with imperfect information and stochastic market 
outcomes between boards, managers and outside shareholders in a general equilibrium 
setting.  We show that a renegotiation-proof managerial contract that deters cheating is 
possible only if outsider stake in the firm does not 
personal wealth of the entrepreneur thus limits the size of the firm, a limit that arises not 
from technology but from moral hazard.  A novel twist is thus provided to the age-old 
controversy regarding long run equilibrium firm size.  
  Further, the personal wealth of the entrepreneur must be enough for his firm both 
to reach the minimum viable size and to pay the manager enough to induce honesty.  
Those with less wealth can only b
  25capital
ing wealth inequality in a poor but open economy.  It also provides 
 rationale for paying managers substantially more than their opportunity cost – but only 
 the form of salary. 
).  For certain configurations of the wealth distribution, the equilibrium (and 
therefore the industry) disappears. 
Our model helps explain the proliferation of family firms in relatively poor 
countries, moral hazard induced vicious circles retarding the development of poorer 
economies relative to richer ones with the same degree of inequality, and points to the 
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